Quiat on Claims : New York Disability Insurance Lawyer & Attorney : Michael Quiat : Uscher Quiat Uscher & Russo Law Firm : ERISA, Denied Claims

Although group insurance coverage normally expires on the last day of employment, most group policies have provisions that allow the coverage to be converted to an individual policy.

Under the law, the burden of clear notice to the employee of this conversion option is placed upon the employer, while the employee, once properly notified, has the burden of arranging for the individual policy to be issued.

Although these statements of the law are well accepted, the facts of individual cases sometimes lead to the conclusion that a review is in order so that employer and employee are both aware of what is required of them.

Such a case is Hauth v. Prudential Insurance Company, 2010 WL 3168279, in which the notice purportedly given by the employer was scrutinized to see if it was adequate when the employee, although terminally ill, failed to convert to an individual life policy.

Although there was a note in the benefits administrator‘s file that notice of the conversion privilege had been given to the employee the day after employment termination, there was no indication in the record of how the purported notice had been given or the form in which it had been given.

Relying on Canada life Assurance Co. v. Estate of Lebowitz, 185 F. 3rd 231 (4th Cir. 1999),the court ruled that any notice of conversion required by an insurance policy must be in writing, and must include:

* The date when the group coverage would expire.

* The date when the right of conversion to individual coverage would expire.

* The procedure to be followed by the employee when converting from group to individual coverage.

* The amount of the premium required to convert the policy.

Without these four requirements being clearly met, the court ruled that there was not the written notice of conversion required by the group policy and that therefore, claimant is entitled to collect under the terms of the group policy even though no longer employed.

In an unusual move for a court, it used “common sense” to make the cheese more binding. The court noted that the claimant was gravely ill when terminated (in fact, he died 41 days after termination). In such circumstances, the court found that there was no logical reason to suppose that had he been given adequate written notice of his right to convert a group life policy to individual coverage, that he would not have done so.

There is a lesson to be learned here for everybody involved in group insurance, the employee, employer and even the insurance company:

When the group policy calls for written notice to the employee of the right to convert a group policy interest to an individual interest, the employer should make certain the notice is in writing, contains the expiration date of policy coverage and of the right to convert the policy, and the amount of the premium the employee will have to pay to convert the policy.

The insurance company also has a great interest in seeing that the employer complies or it may wind up having to pay the piper.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In disability income insurance circles the word “malingering” is always used to paint the claimant black, but the word “malingerer” should be applied to insurance companies far more often than to claimants, for many insurance companies are open and blatant “malingerers” when it comes to paying benefits.
 

This was made very clear in a recent opinion in the 7th Circuit when the court raked MetLife over the coals for using an arsenal of shady denial tactics to thwart an ERISA claim based on subjective complaints, (Holmstrom v. Metropolitan Life, 2010 WL 3024870, 7th Cir., 2010).
 

In this case, the appellate court found a litany of reasons why the denial of benefits to Holmstrom was “arbitrary and capricious”, even though the Federal District Court from which the appeal was taken had found that MetLife’s denial of benefits was sound.
 

Why do courts (and, generally, the public) have no difficulty in believing a claimant is “malingering” when seeking benefits, but never seem to seriously consider whether an insurer is “malingering” when it comes to paying benefits?
 

One might reasonably ask if a corporation which stays alive on profits is any less likely to shave morality to obtain a larger income than is an individual who stays alive on work income and might shave morality to stop working and use benefits to keep the family going?
 

Some claimants do try to malinger by not working and collecting benefits when they are not actually disabled. Insurance companies are right to contest these claims vigorously. But, there also compelling evidence that some disability insurance carriers make it a policy to actively “malinger’ on paying benefits. One only has to go back to 2004 to the Unum settlement with 49 states to see the pattern of no-pay strategies employed by these insurers. Yet, insurance companies are still not labeled “malingerers”. Why not?
 

When individuals are suspected of malingering, there is a battery of tests used by insurers to try to detect the falsity of the claim for benefits. Insurers have used them for years and years and have had many a success in beating down a claimant, some deservedly so, some not.
 

Since it is abundantly clear that insurance companies malinger when it comes time to pay disability benefits, why isn’t there a test for insurance company “malingerers”? Why should claimants be any less entitled to challenge benefit denials in court in a manner supposedly as objective as the one they face when making a claim? More importantly, why shouldn’t there be a real consequence when insurance companies ?
 

As the Holmstrom court pointed out, such a test might include the following questions:
 

* Did the insurer require the claimant to make application for Social Security benefits? If so, did the insurer give appropriate weight to the result of the SSDI application?
* Did the insurer’s doctors actually physically examine the claimant? If not, what appropriate weight should the opinion of these doctors be given in view of the type of disability claimed?
* Did the insurer appropriately evaluate treating doctors’ reports?
* Did the insurer giver appropriate weight to objective test results?
* Was the claimant’s actual medical history appropriately considered by the insurance company?
* Did the insurer appropriately take into account the cognitive impairments which are likely to result from medication required by the claimant’s condition?
* Did the insurer inappropriately ignore overwhelming evidence of disability by treating doctors in favor of the opinions of its doctors who never examined the patient?
* Did the insurer continue to move the goal posts so the claimant could never kick a field goal, i.e., provide the proof necessary to convince the insurer?
 

“Appropriate” is a key word, because it should not be enough for an insurer to say “we deny” without giving reasons appropriate to the level of the claimant’s proof, to support “we deny”. If Congress, in writing ERISA, thought plan administrators, especially insurance companies, would be paragons of virtue when it came to protecting employees, (29 U.S.C. 1001, et seq.) they were horribly mistaken.
 

To even the playing field in light of Firestone v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989), reviewing courts should require insurers to provide rebuttals to claimant’s proofs which are on a level with the quality of those proofs.
 

Case law is full of instances where the desire not to pay benefits was so outrageous, that courts, usually restrained in their language, take the defendant insurance companies to task severely.
 

Yet, when it comes to the word “malingering”, courts and the public seem to reserve the term for claimants only.
 

If it looks like a duck, acts like a duck and quacks like a duck, why not call it a duck?
 

Insurance company disability plan administrators are many times “malingerers” of the worst kind when it comes to paying benefits.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Lawyers sometimes have a habit of using more words than necessary. Many times this just bores the audience. Sometimes, it really, really hurts.

A case in point is the rule banning the use of the discretionary clause in health insurance policies in New Jersey. Discretionary clauses have been used by courts since the 1980s to require ERISA claimants to show that disability income claim denials by employers and insurance companies are “arbitrary and capricious” before the merits of the claim can be considered. This sea change in ERISA jurisprudence was based upon the Supreme Court decision in Firestone v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).

In 2006, the New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance responded to our request to do something about this unfair burden on plaintiffs in a relatively prompt manner for a state agency. (As an aside, it has taken the State of New York years longer to respond).

But, in drafting the regulation, the New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance felt it necessary to insert the unnecessary word “sole” before the word “discretion”, and to add language about review which accomplishes nothing as the law now stands. So, now the regulation (N.J.A.C. 11:4-58.3) reads as follows:

“ No individual or group health insurance policy or contract, individual or group life insurance policy or contract, individual or group long-term care insurance policy or contract, or annuity contract, delivered or issued for delivery in this State may contain a provision purporting to reserve sole discretion to the carrier to interpret the terms of the policy or contract, or to provide standards of interpretation or review that are inconsistent with the laws of this State. A carrier may include a provision stating that the carrier has the discretion to make an initial interpretation as to the terms of the policy or contract, but that such interpretation can be reversed by an internal utilization review organization, a court of law, arbitrator or administrative agency having jurisdiction.”

Why is it worded this way? Who knows? The word “sole” adds nothing and opens wide the door to confusion.

When we first saw the proposed regulation, we thought that the word “sole” was unnecessary and was very likely to cause a problem in the courts. We wrote to the Department of Banking and Insurance and objected to this language – to no avail. So, the word “sole” remained in the regulation, lying in wait for some poor claimant to fall prey to its tendency to confuse.

Lo and behold – it happened.

In the case of Evans v. Employee Benefit Plan, et als, 2009 WL 418628 (3rd Cir. 2009), which was decided on other grounds, the Court posited that the New Jersey ban on giving deference in insurance policy language only applied to policies which gave “sole” discretion to the administrator. Since the policy language used only the word “discretion” and did not use the word “sole”, the Court reasoned that the regulation would not apply, even though the policy gave no discretion to make decisions to any other person or entity!

What is “discretion” but the authority to decide an issue? If you are the only one with authority to decide an issue, what can the word “sole” add to your power of discretion? If more than one person has discretion to decide an issue, then none of them, alone, has discretion without the other(s).

As we had previously pointed out to the NJ Banking and Insurance Commission when N.J.A.C. 11:4-58.3 was proposed, amendment to N.J.A.C. 11:4-58.3 is required forthwith. The NJ Department made it clear in 2006 that giving deference to the administrator is against public policy. N.J.A.C. 11:4-58.3 was undoubtedly intended to ban the discretionary language from disability income insurance policies in the State. Why let the unnecessary word “sole” cause any confusion so as to threaten the policy rights of New Jersey citizens when they become disabled?

We intend to pursue the issue of amendment with the State until it goes into effect. Otherwise, there will be cases in which New Jersey disability income claimants are deprived of what is due them, because of an unnecessary extra word in the regulation.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

When a judicial branch has a monopoly on hearing a certain type of case, one would think that judges in that branch would be meticulous in steering clear of anything which might make them look like they favored one side or the other.

Why then do some Federal District Court judges continue to attend a luxurious “forum” on Defending and Managing ERISA Litigation, a conference which “…is devoted entirely to the defense of claims…”? There has been an improvement, though. Last year 21 Federal judges attended this meeting (see Lest Ye Be Judged). This year only 9 Federal judges are scheduled to speak.
 

That’s progress, but what about ERISA disability income claimants who may be litigants in the district courts of these judges? How comfortable can they be?
 

We would guess the claimants would not be too comfortable if they knew the flier announcing the conference proclaims that the attending judges will discuss for the attending ERISA defense lawyers: "View from The Bench: Federal District & Magistrate Judges Speak out on How to Convey Complexities to the Court (including plan documents and the ERISA Statute), Effective Theories/Defenses, Evidentiary Approaches, Statute of Limitations, Deciding Cases Early, Discovery, Forum Shopping and More."
 

The brochure follows this synopsis of judicial topics with more of an explanation: “You cannot afford to miss this unique opportunity to hear (from the judges): “…the theories and defenses that are most effective; which arguments are most effective on a motion to dismiss; the best ways to limit discovery in a conflict of interest situation; and judicial pet peeves that could turn a case in your favor”.
 

These judicial insights are being revealed to a conference which strictly appeals to one side of bar - the ERISA litigation defense bar. If you figure that the judge’s trip to the posh Helsmsley Hotel in New York and other seminar goodies were paid for by the conference sponsors and that the judges were surrounded for a couple of days by attendees whose sole occupation is to beat ERISA claimants in courts presided over by Federal District Court judges, you have to wonder why any judges participate.
 

How “comforting” to a disabled ERISA worker trying to battle an insurance company for disability benefits, especially if the claimant’s case is being heard by one of the judges on the panel giving insights to insurance defense lawyers.
 

We know that some judges are able to overcome the effects of being treated well and being exposed to a one-sided view of a legal issue, but why should an ERISA litigant have to wonder if his or her judge is one who can really shuck off all that one-sided baggage?
 

Wouldn’t it be better for judges to avoid attending and lecturing at highly partisan convocations which take a single-minded, biased view of a legal issue when that legal issue might well come before that judge in future?
 

Like Caesar’s wife, these arbiters of ERISA claims should be above any suspicion.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Ever since Firestone v. Bruch, 109 S. Ct. 948 (1989),many disability insurance carriers have been getting a free ride on SSDI. 

LTD insurance companies force claimants to pursue Social Security for disability benefits so they can recoup monies they have laid out in paying the  private insurance claim.  And then insurers totally ignore the SSDI disability finding when evaluating the claim they have to pay under their ERISA policy. 

 However, as courts come to realize the obvious conflict of interest these claims generate, they are beginning to look at this free ride more and more closely.  Why should insurers be permitted to force claimants to go after SSDI benefits and then totally ignore them when deciding its own case with the same claimant?
 

The U. S. Supreme Court itself has recognized the problem.  It succinctly stated in MetLife v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343 (2008)  at Page 2352:
 

“…MetLife had encouraged Glenn to argue to the Social Security Administration that she could do no work, received the bulk of the benefits of her success in doing so (being entitled to receive an offset from her retroactive Social Security award), and then ignored the agency’s finding in concluding she could do sedentary work…”

Wouldn’t it be more evenhanded to have a successful SSDI claim raise a rebuttable presumption in the private LTD case that the claim is legitimate medically and is totally disabling?  Such a presumption would not be anywhere near a  lock on the issue, but would require the insurance company to come forth with reasonable proof that the SSDI finding was mistaken or that the SSDI decision did not apply to the current LTD claim. 

Proving SSDI claims is not a walk in the park.  SSDI judges have no more inclination to award benefits than do employers and insurance companies.  Only about one-third of SSDI claims result in benefits being initially awarded to claimants.  There is no conflict of interest nagging at an SSDI judge as there is at an insurance administrator, so the SSDI decision would appear more reliable.

While the SSDI judgment should not bind the insurer, it is a considered judicial decision that warrants more than a snub in defense of a claim.

If Federal District Courts were to hold that SSDI judgments raise a rebuttable presumption that a claimant is totally disabled, the insurer would be required to rebut on the merits a judgment by an unconflicted court, instead of paying the judgment lip service, and then ignoring it, to justify denial of a private LTD claim for its own benefit.

There are many reasons why such a presumption could be overcome by an insurance company:

* The terms of the insurance policy does not cover the illness or injury
* Evidence of an error in the SSDI proceeding or findings
* New evidence after the SSDI hearing (the claimant should also then be able to meet this evidence).
* Fraud on the SSDI court which impugns the decision (i.e., evidence that the claimant is working)..

With a rebuttable presumption approach, more weight would be given to an SSDI judgment, but the judgment still would not be binding on the Federal District Court when the insurer could show, with real evidence, that it should not be binding.

Such a judgment should not be ignored by an insurer which has benefited from it, unless there is a legitimate evidentiary reason for not following it.

A rebuttable presumption approach by Federal Courts to SSDI judgments would seem to be a fair way to deal with this crucial issue in ERISA LTD cases.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The first thing disability insurance companies do when hit with a claim in a state court that even mentions ERISA is to move it over into Federal District Court. It’s an almost knee-jerk reaction, no matter what the cause of action, because insurers seem to feel more comfortable in a federal court.

This feeling may be because a lot of plaintiff’s attorneys practice mostly in state courts and are unfamiliar with the practice and procedure in federal jurisdictions. Or, it may be that insurers get a warm and fuzzy feeling in federal courts because ERISA usually gives them a “deference” leg up in an ERISA matter.

Whatever the reason, automatic removal of such cases in the 2nd Circuit will no longer be a slam dunk after Stevenson v. The Bank of New York Company, Inc., . In Stevenson, the Federal District Court sent a case removed from the state court back to the state because the complaint did not make a claim about ERISA and its standards, or the conduct of any ERISA functionaries in their ERISA capacities.

In Stevenson, plaintiff sued Bank of New York because he alleged certain promises were made to him that if he worked abroad for the bank, his rights under certain ERISA plans would be maintained, and he would suffer no loss under those plans as a result of working abroad. His suit sounded in contract and tort law, having nothing to do with the interpretation of ERISA or his rights under ERISA.

Yet, the Bank of New York was able to remove the case from state to federal court, purportedly on the basis of ERISA jurisdiction, and further, to get the District Court to dismiss the complaint.

Holding that the claims in the complaint are neutral toward ERISA plans and that mention of ERISA in the complaint was just used to describe the underlying consideration for the contract, the 2nd Circuit remanded the case back to the District Court, with directions to remand the case back to the state courts for further proceedings.

So from now on, at least in New York, Connecticut and Vermont, insurers will have to do more than show that a complaint just mentions ERISA to get a removal into their warm and fuzzy place – the Federal District Court.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

A recent 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals ruling got us to thinking about the effect of lengthy litigation on an award in disability income cases.

In Eshelman v. Agere Systems, Inc., 554 F. 3rd 426, the appellate court upheld a District Court decision awarding additional damages to the plaintiff’s jury award of $200,000, to cover the added taxes she would have to pay because she received a lump sum award rather than having been paid her salary over a period of years as she would have if she had not been discriminated against.

Well, we reasoned, shouldn’t the same thinking be applied to disability income insurance cases which many insurers cause to be dragged on for years and years when it is apparent to any disinterested observer that the claim should have been paid early on. The insurance company’s reluctance (almost a reflex action when it comes to paying claims) should not cause the disabled policyholder more grief by adding to his or her tax burden.

The circumstances are very similar. When a person loses a position because of the wrongful action of the employer, the person loses the benefit of being paid weekly or monthly and paying income taxes periodically through withholding and annual tax returns.

When an insurer wrongfully drags out the award of benefits to a disabled person, the claimant loses the benefit of being paid these insurance monies weekly or monthly and paying income taxes (if the benefits are taxable) annually. (Generally, disability income benefits are taxable if an employer pays the policy premium and non-taxable if the insured pays the policy premium).

If a disability income case drags on for awhile (some are known to have gone 10 years or more), and results in a lump sum award to make up for the years during which no monies were paid, that lump sum is taxed in the year it is received by the claimant. Many times this puts the recipient in a much higher tax bracket, meaning that a much larger percentage of the award will have to be paid than the claimant would have paid if benefits were received and taxes paid each year.

As a result, the claimant is not made whole, receiving less money in his or her pocket than he or she would have received if paid monthly for the period

We believe it fair that a District Court judge have the discretion to make an additional financial award to make up for the tax difference so as to make the plaintiff whole when appropriate evidence has been elicited to support such a tax award.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Texas has now joined New York in trying to level the playing field for their ERISA disability income insurance claimants. Both states have proposed new regulations designed to negate the deference courts give to insurance companies in deciding disability income cases under ERISA.

If the regulations are finalized and become law, New York and Texas will join more than 20 other states in giving their citizens an even chance to prove their right to disability benefits.

These problems started with the case of Firestone v Bruch, 489 U.S, 101, when the U.S. Supreme Court found that, under the court’s interpretation of trust law, ERISA plans could be written so that discretion is given to claims administrator’s in deciding claims, and courts would then be obliged to give deference to the administrator’s findings.

This led to the concept of “arbitrary and capricious” review in ERISA disability cases. Under Bruch, the administrator’s denial of a claim would be upheld unless the claimant could show that the denial was “arbitrary and capricious”, a term of art in the law. This rule raised a mountain in the path of the claimant. If there was any reasonable basis for the denial, it would be upheld, no matter how compelling the claimant’s contrary evidence might be.

The major problem with giving deference is that the administrator is many times the insurer who pays the claim. So, if the administrator approves the claim, it also has to pay the claim out of its own funds. This deference power in a conflict of interest situation would try the moral fiber of an angel. So, you can imagine what it does to insurance companies which are far from angels!

There have been many examples of how this conflict works against disabled employees, including the most infamous one – the Unum 49-state investigation of its claims handling practices, which led to a large settlement with Unum and the reopening for review of more than 220,000 Unum case disability income denials.

What makes this deference requirement of Bruch even more problematic for claimants is the principle of preemption which makes federal law completely controlling over state law in ERISA matters. Courts have held that states have very little to say in these cases, with one big exception – states have the right to determine the language of insurance policies in their jurisdiction. In policy language, state word is law.

As a result, many states which object to insurance companies getting the upper hand over their citizens because of Bruch, have banned the use of discretionary language which favors insurers, in approving the policy forms used in their state.

One would think that every state would look out for its people in this way, especially when it takes so little effort.

What is surprising is that about half of the states haven’t done it yet, leaving the insurers with the upper hand against their own people.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The U.S. Supreme court took a big chunk out of the “discretionary” fortress erected by ERISA disability income carriers when it reversed a 4th Circuit Court opinion in Hardt v Reliance Insurance, 2010 WL 2025127 (5/24/10).  In Hardt, the court decided that claimants do not have to be a “prevailing party” to win attorney fees.

The discretionary fortress is built on the discretion ERISA gives plan administrators to determine whether a given plan covers a claim. Since many times the plan administrator is also the insurance carrier which would have to pay the claim, you don’t have to be a genius to figure out which way such discretion leans.

The Hardt decision, in effect, turns the tables on insurers which have been using their ERISA-granted “discretion” for decades to hamstring claimants without fear of penalty to themselves. Now, misuse of their “discretion” can very well lead to insurers paying the claimant’s legal fees, since Hardt holds that the award of fees in such cases is solely in the “discretion” of the trial court.

In the Hardt case, the District Court awarded legal fees to the claimant because she provided compelling evidence that she was totally disabled. Although the District Court did not decide the issue of claimant’s entitlement to benefits, it awarded her a remand order which sent the matter back to the insurance company for a new review. Upon looking at the matter on remand, Reliance reversed its prior denial of benefits and awarded benefits to Hardt.

However, Reliance balked at paying Hardt’s attorney fees, saying that under the American Rule (each litigant pays his or her own attorney), she was not entitled to be paid the fees it cost her to prove her case because she had not “prevailed” in the matter because all she had actually “won” was a remand back to Reliance. The 4th Circuit Court of Appeals agreed and overruled the trial court on the award of legal fees, since, according to the Circuit Court, she had not “prevailed”.

The Supreme Court ruled that the language of 29 U.S.C.1132(g), the ERISA statute which authorizes an exception to the American Rule, gives the trial court discretion to award fees so long as the plaintiff has achieved “some degree of success on the merits”. In this case, the Supreme Court held that by winning a remand at the District Court level, plaintiff had met the “degree of success on the merits” requirement.

Now, hopefully, there will be fewer American Rule free rides for insurance companies who are in the habit of saying “No” to just about every claim they conjure up the flimsiest doubt about, since they think they have nothing to lose. Carriers will have to consider the cost to them if the claimant succeeds in obtaining a removal, even though there is no final judgment by the court.

This ruling by the nation’s top court will give insurers pause before they force claimants to battle through the courts when the insurer well knows that the ERISA policyholder has a good case. All too often this tactic is used by the insurance company in the hope that the claimant will run out of money for lawyers or will just be discouraged by the roadblocks of litigation and go away.

Now that they know they are more likely to be held accountable for the claimant’s attorney fees when their conduct fails to comply with the law, insurers may reconsider this tactic and afford more policyholders the relief they are supposed to get.

The Hardt ruling will help insurance companies understand that “discretion” in ERISA means a measured judgment based upon a full and fair consideration of all of the facts, not a reflex denial just because it saves the company money.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link